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TIH~ Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
approved the freedom of choice plan in United States
v. Jefferson (372 F .2d 836. 1966). The court there
reali zed that the fre edom oi' choice plan was only a
means to an end . not a goal in itself They recogni zed
that there was no inalienable right to choose one's
school. The school board had the affirmative duty to
sec that the freedom or choice plan complied with
the HEW guidelines , and if it did not, to adopt
another. The Fifth Circuit did not comment on the
constitutionality of the de facto . as opposed to de
jure segregated systems . The Civil Rights Act of 1964
applied to de · jure school systems. Segregation
resulting from racially motivated gerrymandering is
characterized as de jure segregation . De facto
segregation is non-racially motivated segregation in a
school system based on a single neighborhood school
for all children in a definable area. The issue of th e
constitutionality of de facto segregation is expected
to be argued before the Supreme Court in th e near
future .
Recently, the U.S. Senate adopted by a vote of 56
to 36 the "Stennis Amendment" that requires HEW
to apply its school desegregation guidelines evenly
throughout the country--cutting off federal school
money to segregated districts in the North as well as
in the South . Tiuough the instrumentality of this
amendment the Senate has abolished the distinction
·between de facto and de jure segregation in Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

In Green v. County School Board (391 U.S. 430,
1968), the Supreme Court held that in desegregating
a dual system a plan utilizing "freedom of choice" is
not an end in itself. Desegregation as soon as is
practicable is the goal. Unless the plan aids in the
achieving of that goal, it is useless . The unanimous
opinion lays out a basic groundwork of legal
principles by which a school district that operates a
dual system can effect a transition to a unitary
nonracial system. The Court made it clear that the
time for "deliberate speed" has passed and that
immediate implementation is the most desirable
means. The Court also allowed the "freedom of
choice" plan to be a riermissi ble "tool of
desegregation" only where it works better than any
other reasonably available alternative. Finally , the
Court also said that it was relevant that the School
Board did not take its first step until eleven years
after Brown I and that the burden of proof was upon
the school board to establish that its proposed plan
was the best and most effective method of achieving
meaningful
and
immediate
progress
toward
disestablishing state-imposed segregation at the
earliest practicable date. Accordingly, "freedom of
choice" will be unacceptable whenever a more
feasible plan for immediate desegregation is available.
The Court in Green could have held that the
"freedom
of
choice"
plan
was
in
itself

unconstitutional because it violated the thrust of
Brown 11 which placed the burden of enforcement on
the school boards. Clearly the "freedom of choice"
plan places most of the burden of desegregztion on
the parents and children. Brown 11 wisely relieved the
parents and children of such a burden because the
Court realized that due to fear , repression, historical
traditions, socio-economic conditions and ignorance,
the Negro in th e South could not freely exericse such
a burden. In light of subsequent District Court
impleme ntation, a holding that the "freedom of
choice" plan was unconstitutional would have been a
more effective solution to the implementation of
Brown.
Variations of the "freedom of choice" plan have
also be rejected. In a companion case to Green, a
"free transfer" provision of a zone plan was held
unacceptable as it was applied because it failed to
work now. The school officials set up an attendance
zone scheme drawn along geographic boundaries with
a provision whereby any child could freely transfer to
another school of his choice within the zone. After
three years there remained an all-Negro junior high
school.
The Court looked upon this as they did the
"freedom of choice" plan -- the means failed to bring
about the required constitutional end and acordingly
the plan was held invalid. Free transfer provisions can
make any acceptable plan illusory in actual practice,
for in effect it is a "freedom of choice" plan for
re-segregation . The Supreme Court has allowed that a
"free transfer" plan might be valid but that it would
be unacceptable where "racial segregation is the
consequence." The Fifth Circuit has approved
provisions permitting transfers from racial majority to
racial minority schools, but have refused to allow the
converse , as being "tantamount to an authorization
to white students to re-segregate."
The Fifth Circuit in Adams v. Mathews, (403 F.
2d 181, 1968), elaborated upon the mandates in
Green. The Court stated in Adams that:
If in a school district there are still all-Negro
schools or only a small fraction of Negroes
enrolled in white schools or no substantial
integration of faciiities and school activities then,
as a matter of law, the existing plan fails to meet
constitutional standards as established in Green.
In Adams the Court adopted another standard , the
non-existence of any all-Negro schools. In accordance
with this standard the Court has even refused to
accept a "freedom of choice" plan where 45.9 per
cent of the Negro children were in formerly white
schools when there was one all-Negro school and two
all white schools in a system consisting of eighteen
schools. Accordingly, an acceptable plan must have a
considerable percentage of Negro children in formerly
all white schools, there can no longer be in existence
an all-Negro school or one with only a small
percentage of whites, and the acceptable standard
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cannot be whether it could work. but whether the
plan is now working.
The Fifth Circuit has not been entirely inflexible
in its position on the immediacy of desegregation. ln
Graves v. Walton (410 F. 2nd 1153 , 1969). they
allowed a plan where the school districts were divided
into rigid attendance zones except for one school. In
that school , kindergarten and grades one through
seven were to be desegregated instantly while grades
eight through twelve were to remain as a
predominantly Negro high school for only one year,
1968-69. The next year it would become a junior
high school for all students in one zone. The Court
reasoned that this was only for one year and took
notice of the fact that "there are still many all-Negro
schools in this curcuiL all of which 'were on notice'
they must be integrated or abandoned" by the start
of the I 969-70 school year.
Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit has fail ed to be
entirely consistent. In U.S. v. Baldwin County Board
of Education (407 F. 2d 1286. 1969), the Court
allowed a "freedom of choice" plan for student
desegregation to take effect September 1. 1969. The
court noted that there were two all-Negro schools
within the county but that their elimination was not
to be effective until September l, 1970. Thev then
stated:
Steps which may be taken by the Board to
eliminate racial identification of the present
all-Negro schools. in addition to specific
requirements of faculty integration, are the
establishment of vocational or other special
courses of instruction, summer schools, and
desegregation of staff and transportation and all
types of extracurricular activities and facilities.
Not only is the effective date of September l , 1970 a
year later than required by every other case decided
on student desegregation, but the order did not eve n
require the desegregation of the all-Negro student
bodies by that d ate. Clearly, Adams and Baldwin are
contradictory orders. The school boards and district
courts have since relied heavily on Baldwin.
Complete desegregation has to include integration
of faculties, staff, facilities, transportation and school
activities. In U.S. v. Jefferson (3 72 F. 2d 836, 1966 ),
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said that
total faculty integra tion meant that 'the pattern of
teacher assignment to any particular school should
not be identifiable as tailored for a heavy
concentration of either Negro or white pupils in the
schools." In Jefferson, the only teachers who were
transferred were those teachers who volunteered to
move to a school with a different racial majority than
their own. The Court rejected the plan that permitted
the school board to shift the responsibility for faculty
desegregation from themselves to the teachers. The
affirmative duty on the part of the school boards
cannot be "left to the voluntariness of teacher

applicants or transfers."
The school board must actively seek out
qualified instructors who arc willing to teach
children of any color. The voluntary approach is
demonstrably not adequate. and the school
board must do everything within its power to
recruit and reassign teachers so as to provide for
a substantial degree of faculty integration.
As a defense. many school boards contend that
whatever action they may decide to take would
amount to a breach of contract on their part. Some
contracts prohibit reassignment without teacher
approval and others arc drawn with specific schools in
mind. The Fifth Circuit response to this has been that
local hiring practices. state laws and teacher contracts
are "invalid to the extent that they frustrate the
implementation of a constitutional mandate" (U.S. v.
Indianola. 410 F.2d 626, 1969). Furthermore. the
Court has required the school board to withhold
approval of contracts whenever "necessary to achieve
more racially balanced fa cul ties" (U.S. v. Greenwood
406 F. 2d I 086. 1969).
District Courts and local school boards arc not the
only ones slowing the desegregation process. In the
opinion of many President Ni xon. Secretary of HEW
Robert Finch. Attorney General John Mitchell, and
Assistant Attorney General J erris Leonard of the
Justic Department's Civil Rights Division, are
interposing politics between Court desegregation
orders and recalcitrant school distric ts. Secretary
Finch recently sent a letter to a trio of district court
judges in Mississippi with a copy to Chief Judge
Brown of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
requesting a d elay in the d esegregation of thirty
Mississippi school districts. The reasons advanced for
the requested delay were that the HEW guidelines
were hastily drawn and that more time was needed so
that a better prepared plan could be presented .
However. it was the opinion of an overwhelming
number of division staff attorn eys of the Justice
Department that the request co nstituted delaying
tactics. These attorneys revolted and presented to Mr.
Leonard and Attorney General Mitchell their
objections. Judge Brown immediately notified the
district judges that no such request was to be granted
and that the September 1969 dea dline was to be
maintained. However, when Mr. Leonard appeared
for the Justic e Department before district judges to
ask for a delay until December I, 1969, those judges
readily granted the request.
With great reluctance Mr. Justice Black also
granted the request for delay. He said that in his view
the Negro students "are entitled to have their
constitutional
rights vindicated
now
without
postponement for any reason." He refused, however,
to grant relief because he felt that "when an
individual Justice is asked to gra!1t special
relief ... he must consider ... what action the entire
Court might possibly take." He realized that his views
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went beyond anything that the Court had expressly
held to date and that "there is language [in
Green l . .. which might be interpreted as approving a
transition period during which federal courts would
continue to supervise the passage or Southern schools
from dual to unitary systems."
The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court and
on October 29 . 1969 it vacated the delaying order
saying that the time for "all deliberate speed" is no
longer constitutionally permissible. The Court
directed that each school district "begin immediately
to operate as unitary school systems within which no
person is to be effectively excluded from any school
because of race or color." The Court instructed the
Court of Appe::!ls for the Fifth Circuit to accept all or
part of HEW's recommendations. It also indicated
that the District Court could hear any objections to
those proposals but that "the Court of Appeal's
order shall be complied with in all respects while th e
District Court considers such objections ." No
amendment could ' ' become effective before being
passed upon by the Court of Appeals'~ (Alexander v.
Holmes County Board of Education 24 L. Ed . 2d 19.
1969).
If there was any doubt about the meaning of
"immediately" mentioned in Alexander, it was
clearly defined in Carter v. West Feliciana Parish
School Board (24 L. Ed. 2d 4 77 , 1970). There the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a
district court rejection of proposed plans for
desegregation for the 1969-70 school year. It ordered
the school boards to completely desegregate faculties
and to adopt plans for unitary school systems by
February I , I 970, but authorized a delay in pupil
desegregation until September I 970. On appeal the
Supreme Court summarily reversed the Fifth Circuit
insofar as the deiay of student body desegregation
beyond February l , I 970.
What is perhaps most enlightening about the
Carter case is the fact that for the first time the
Supreme Court expressed differing opinions as to the
speed of desegregation. In a concurring opinion Mr.
Justice Harlan , joined by Mr. Justice White, felt that
something additional needed to be said about the
intended effect of the Alexander decision with the
idea of giving some guidance to future litigation .
Justice Harlan viewed Alexander as meaning that
relief should become effective immediately after the
courts have approved a desegregation plan and that
"proposals for amendments [to the approved plan]
are in no way to suspend the relief granted." He
further felt that a maximum timetable of eight weeks
from
the
finding
of
noncompliance
with
desegregation requirements was enough time to
accomplish whatever steps were necessary to comply
with the court order. Justices Black, Douglas,
Brennan and Marshall specifically disagreed with Mr.
Harlan. They felt Harlan's opinion retreated from the
"at once" requirement of Alexander. Finally, Chief

Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Stewart expressed the
opinion that the Fifth Circuit was far more familiar
and better able to handle the various problems that
arise and that therefore it was error to reverse that
Court "without argument and without opportunity
for exploration of the varying problems of individual
school districts."
Taking into consideration the various opinions in
Carter, Alexander seems to mean that desegregation
may no longer be delayed once the school year has
begun: that implementation of a plan has to begin
immediately--immediately being no longer than eight
weeks.
Alexander has finally begun to make Brown a
reality. Schools throughout the South are rapidly
being forced into unitary systems . The federal courts
must maintain the pressure in this area, for the once
recalcitrant school districts could easily backslide to a
prior position.
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